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BOOK REVIEW
Competition Policy for Small Market Economies by Michal S. Gal, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 2003, xii + 324 pp.
Developing countries are finding it imperative to reshape or modify their policy frame-
works, due to the intensification of economic competition accompanying globalization 
as well as growing calls for the harmonization of laws and institutional arrangements. 
Against this backdrop, the question of how developing economies should and can build 
competitive environments suited for economic development has become an issue of both 
theoretical and practical importance. For example, the 2002 issue of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report1 focuses on building institutions well adapted for market economies. 
In Chapter 7, “Competition,” the report comprehensively discusses problems that devel-
oping countries face as they implement competition policies. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel 
Prize laureate and former World Bank chief economist, also notes that though appropriate 
competition policies must be at work properly in order to deal with market imperfections 
resulting from imperfect information, satisfactory policies are not yet in place, and imple-
menting an optimal competition policy entails a number of problems.2
?In this regard, the book under review, which focuses on the competition policies of 
small market economies and examines mainly the legal and institutional aspects of the 
problems that are attendant on the implementation of such policies, is a very interest-
ing piece of academic work. The implementation of competition policy always involves 
the question of how best to strike a balance between scale and scope economies, on the 
one hand, and the benefits of enhanced competition. In realizing economies of scale and 
scope, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the per capita GDP figure as an index of 
economic development, but also to the fact that the absolute market size of an economy is 
an important factor in its development. In order to build market and industrial structures 
that are conducive to realizing economies of scale and scope, due consideration must be 
given to the market size, as measured in terms of the absolute size of the economy, its 
population, and other indices. Written from a standpoint that places importance on the 
relationship between the absolute market size of an economy and its competition policy, 
01 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
02 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Socialism? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 132–34. More 
specifically, Stiglitz calls attention to the following problems attendant on the implementation 
of competition policies: (1) that, in some cases, competition policy has been used as an instru-
ment to limit competition; (2) that antitrust policies interfere with cooperative effort to engage 
in R&D; (3) that antitrust policies put domestic (American) firms at a disadvantage relative to 
foreign firms; and (4) that antitrust policy is with its costs from lawsuits.
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this book undertakes both theoretical inquiries and case studies about the designing of 
competition policy. 
?The overall problematique of the volume is to demonstrate that given the important 
implications of the size of an economy for its competition policy, small market economies 
need to formulate competition policies based on rules different from those underlying 
the competition policies of large economies such as the European Union and the United 
States. In Introduction and Chapter 1, the author delineates the characteristics of small 
market economies. It is assumed here that the market size of an economy is influenced by 
three main factors: population size, population dispersion, and openness to trade (pp. 1–
2). Because of scale economies and the existence of high entry barriers, small economies 
cannot support more than a few competitors in most industries, and thus concentration 
tends to be high in many of their markets. This means that a small economy faces a dif-
ficult question of how to strike a balance between permitting firms to be large and inte-
grated enough to enjoy scale economies, on the one hand, and numerous enough to ensure 
effective rivalry, on the other (pp. 4–5). 
?In Chapter 1, Gal employs an important concept in dealing with this question, namely, 
that of “minimum efficient scale” (MES, p. 14), defined as the “level of output that mini-
mizes average costs.” In an industrial sector where production takes place at less than the 
MES, there is room for realizing scale economies in the sense that expanded production 
will lead to a decrease in unit costs. In a small economy, however, the large size of the 
MES relative to demand gives rise to a number of problems, including high industrial 
concentration levels, high barriers to entry, sub-optimal (i.e., below MES) levels of pro-
duction, a low tendency for firms to specialize in the production of a narrow range of 
products, and a high percentage of economic activities accounted for by the largest firms 
in the economy. The main factors that hinder a small economy in its effort to implement a 
competition policy are natural monopolies, single-firm dominance, and oligopolies.
?Chapter 2 of the book deals with the basic policy alternatives and principles that are 
important for the competition policies of small economies. Here, the primary standard 
for the evaluation of regulatory methods is the extent that they can enhance economic 
welfare. Emphasis is also placed on the need to formulate the regulatory framework in 
such a way that it offers not only incentives to promoting allocative efficiency, but also to 
minimize production costs and promote innovations. Given the fact that the competition 
policy of a small economy must, by nature, be designed with due consideration paid to its 
impact on the economy as a whole, the author contends that it is impossible for the policy 
to encourage competition at the cost of economic efficiency, and that, instead, the realiza-
tion of economic efficiency itself should be one of the policy’s important objectives. Gal 
points out, for example, that achieving economies of scale in production or distribution in 
a small economy reduces the number of firms necessary to supply any given demand, and 
may reduce or even totally eliminate competition in the affected market, with the result 
that, unless proper countermeasures are implemented, the economy as a whole will suffer 
from a loss of efficiency. Thus, when small firms are displaced by larger ones, economic 
and social objectives may substantially diverge.
?Chapter 3 addresses the issue of regulating single-firm dominance. The author believes 
that because of scale economies and high barriers to entry in a small economy, the thresh-
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old market share for the regulation of concentration should be set at a lower level than in 
large economies. From this standpoint, Gal undertakes an international comparison of the 
market power thresholds adopted by six economies of limited size, namely, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Israel, Malta, and Cyprus, and examines whether the market-share 
threshold of 50 per cent adopted by Israel is justifiable or not (pp. 59–68; p. 66, Table 3.1). 
Asserting that market power cannot be evaluated solely by market share, she also refers 
to an instance where the Israeli Competition Tribunal required the submission of an addi-
tional piece of evidence to avoid the “pitfalls of a market-share approach” (pp. 67–68).
?Chapter 4 discusses the regulation of natural monopolies. The problem of natural mo-
nopolies is important in considering the efficient supply of infrastructure-based services 
(such as transportation, shipping, electric power, and communications).3 The author finds 
it especially important to regulate natural monopolies in a small market. At the same time, 
however, she also believes that natural monopolies themselves should not be condemned, 
and thus tries to propose a more realistic approach to their regulation.
?In Chapter 5, the author deals with the regulation of oligopolistic markets. The chap-
ter begins by offering an overview of the economic characteristics peculiar to oligopo-
listic markets, thereby laying the foundations for discussing legal arrangements for the 
regulation of oligopolies. She focuses on the conditions conducive to cooperative conduct 
among oligopolistic firms operating in a small economy. The latter half of the chapter is 
devoted to discussions of two policy questions that emerge when dealing with such co-
operative conduct. The first is how to regulate corporate behavior that promotes coopera-
tion among oligopolistic firms in a way that does not harm social benefits. The second is 
whether there is any possibility that the government’s support to firms that refrain from 
cooperative conduct can reduce allocative and productive efficiency.
?Chapter 6 is devoted to a discussion of merger control policy, which is an important 
means for a small economy to realize “potential efficiencies in oligopolistic markets” (p. 
194). In this chapter the author compares the consumer welfare approach and the total 
welfare approach as criteria for evaluating specific mergers. Under the consumer welfare 
approach, a merger is permitted if it increases consumer surplus. Under the total welfare 
approach, by contrast, a merger is permitted so long as it increases total surplus, consist-
ing of both consumer and producer surplus.4 In other words, even if the merger brings 
about a deadweight loss (p. 204) in consumer surplus or an increase in prices which 
would not take place under a competitive situation, it is permitted so long as it reduces 
costs by a greater margin than the deadweight loss or the price increase. In this case, the 
transfer of welfare from consumers to firms is not counted as a loss of surplus. However, 
03 See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 53.
04 See also Kotaro Suzumura, Competition, Commitment, and Welfare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995). In the field of economics, too, Suzumura uses net market surplus, which is the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, in his theoretical analysis of the effects of an entry restricting 
policy in cases where research and development investment is involved. Suzumura’s findings 
reveal that so long as consumer surplus is employed as the basis for determining whether entry 
should be permitted or not, no excess competition emerges, but that if producer surplus or net 
market surplus is employed, there is a possibility that the industry’s performance may be im-
proved, because the number of firms is reduced below the long-term equilibrium level (p. 208). 
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in the sense that the permission of a merger under the total welfare approach is predicated 
on the cutback on production costs to be attained by the merged unit, the total welfare ap-
proach may be regarded as setting a higher threshold value to mergers. 
?Gal regards the total welfare approach as more desirable for a small economy than the 
consumer welfare approach, for the following reasons. “First and foremost, given the 
concentrated nature of most markets in small economies, a policy that requires a high 
standard of proof of no negative effect on consumer welfare may well lead to market 
stagnation of oligopolistic structures that not only charge supracompetitive prices but do 
not achieve productive efficiency…. Second, the consumer welfare approach may con-
flict with the goal of enhancing the international competitiveness of domestic firms” (p. 
203). The author also calls attention to the fact that the consumer welfare approach does 
not necessarily accomplish distributive objectives. On the other hand, she asserts that, 
under the total welfare approach, it is desirable to leave the task of wealth redistribution 
in the care of the means which are specifically designed to handle wealth redistribution, 
including redistributive taxation schemes, social security programs, and social insurance 
schemes. She also considers it imperative for voters to directly supervise and monitor the 
performance of these redistributive measures. From this perspective, she examines the 
extent to which the total welfare approach has been adopted in the competitive policies of 
small economies such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel (pp. 226–39, espe-
cially Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
?The concluding chapter addresses two sets of problems. One encompasses those con-
cerning prescriptions on competition policies, and problems pertaining to elements that 
supplement competition policies, namely, the question of how to build the institutions in-
dispensable for implementing the policies efficiently, and the question of how to educate 
the general public and the business community about the policies. The second encompass-
es problems that emerge when laws of large economies are applied to small economies, 
including in particular problems stemming from the globalization of economic activities 
and the harmonization of competition laws. The author regards economic efficiency as a 
stand-alone objective that is beyond comparison with others (p. 252), and contends that a 
small economy should adopt the total welfare approach rather than the consumer welfare 
approach (p. 253). She also points out that attempts to harmonize competition laws dictat-
ed mainly by the requirements of promoting international trade can impair the autonomy 
of each country’s competition law, or discount the peculiar needs of each small economy. 
She goes on to assert that it is indispensable for a small economy to be equipped with “a 
competent competition authority and competition court” (p. 255) in order to carry out a 
sufficiently effective competition policy. As is clear from this assertion, the book under-
lines the importance of pursuing competition policy in a highly transparent way. Given 
the fact that, as pointed out by Suzumura5 by referring to the experience of postwar Japan, 
not only legal systems but also an informal means of administrative guidance have often 
been mobilized to help industrial policies accomplish their goals, the reviewer finds the 
observations made in this book very useful and meaningful. 
?Reading this book, which incorporates not only research findings in business and eco-
nomic law but also in economics, has been very rewarding for this reviewer, who special-
05 Suzumura, Competition, Commitment, and Welfare, pp. 202–28.
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izes in development economics. In what follows, instead of commenting directly on the 
book’s accomplishments, I would rather like to say a few words about important themes 
for future research that should be addressed, expanding on the findings of this book.
?First, it seems worthwhile to expand on Gal’s suggestions about the institutional ba-
sis that is necessary not only for small economies, but also for developing economies, 
in implementing appropriate competition policies. She points out that a merger policy 
that places absolute value on competition may hinder the realization of scale and scope 
economies, and therefore is inappropriate for a small economy (pp. 214–15). However, 
in order to ensure that a merger will make the best possible use of the gains from scale 
economies, it is necessary, for example, to actively improve and maintain the competitive 
environment, and thereby to encourage the merged firm to smoothly integrate or readjust 
the organizational structures of the merging parties. Gal herself observes that in order for 
a competition policy to be able to enhance welfare, it must be supplemented by several 
complementary elements (p. 255). While noting that the concrete institutional setups for 
the enforcement of a competition law are beyond the scope of her book, she tentatively 
suggests that it should be necessary (pp. 255–57):
(1) to staff the competition authority with people who are well versed in and have exper-
tise about the theory of industrial organization and competition law, and invest it with 
strong competence and research capability;
(2) to create “a specialized judicial body that is empowered to hear competition law cases 
and is composed, inter alia, of economic experts; by ensuring that an appellate court 
has a limited mandate to overrule economic cases decided by the specialized judicial 
body” (p. 256); and 
(3)  “to educate the general public and the business community about the goals and the 
substantive contents of competition policy” (p. 256).
?Given, moreover, the fact that competition authorities in developing countries suffer 
from serious shortages in human resources and funds, as pointed out by the 2002 edition 
of the World Bank’s World Development Report (pp. 141–42), I also find it important to 
narrow down the ranges of these duties to the levels corresponding to their actual capabil-
ities. The World Bank suggests, for example, that these authorities should start by dealing 
with problems concerning cartels, and exclusive supply or distribution contracts, rather 
than problems of price discrimination and predatory pricing, which are more complicated 
but are not less critical.6
?Second, given the fact that competition produces not only economic benefits but also 
other benefits, it seems appropriate and easy for a government with limited capability to 
carry out a competition policy that is more competition-enhancing than the level recom-
mended in this book. Suzumura emphasizes the importance of the competitive market 
mechanism by referring to the intrinsic value of competition, namely, its tendency to 
facilitate the discovery of information and efficient utilization of resources.7 The 1994 
edition of the World Bank’s World Development Report (pp. 52–72), on the other hand, 
emphasizes that introducing competition to the supplies of infrastructure-based services 
06 World Bank, World Development Report 2002, p. 142.
07 Suzumura, Competition, Commitment, and Welfare, pp. 198–200.
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brings about, in addition to the effects of competition, the side effect of making the insti-
tutional setups and policy measures more transparent and accountable.
?Third, it seems necessary to look into the issue of risks involved in competition policy. 
In this book, Gal focuses on dynamic factors, such as innovations and international com-
petitiveness, and emphasizes the importance of taking a balancing approach in competi-
tion policy (p. 216). It should be remembered, however, that international competitive-
ness is determined not only by the results of competitive policy implemented within the 
economy, but also by the results of policies carried out by rival governments. Innovations 
are also affected by various uncertainties. When these factors are taken into account, what 
Gal regards as optimal competition policies in this book seems to entail the risk of failing 
to achieve the expected results. As part of the effort to make a competition policy trans-
parent and accountable to the population, it is imperative to make explicit the basis for the 
evaluation of such risks.
?It is the reviewer’s sincere hope that this book will be read and examined by a wide au-
dience, so that the foregoing important research topics will be tackled in earnest.                         
(Hiroki Nogami)
